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From the editorCommentary by Pen Computing Magazine's editor-in-chiefBy Conrad H. Blickenstorfer September 2000, issue 35
Students of automotive history know that there was a time when there were dozens
of companies manufacturing vehicles. Today, there are just a handful left, the
result of, to some extent, economic Darwinism, and to a much greater extent,
mergers and acquisitions. The likes of Cord, Packard, Studebaker, Rambler, or
American Motors are long gone, and what remained was the "Big Three" (General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler). Now, with no one else left within national
boundaries, consolidation continues on an international level. GM and Ford are on
the prowl, snapping up, or buying into, the likes of Fiat, Jaguar, Mazda, Volvo,
Saab, and Mitsubishi. The smallest of the Big Three, Chrysler, found itself on
the receiving end of a merger and was essentially swallowed by the German Daimler
corporation.
Though attracting nowhere near as much public coverage and attention, the
same thing is happening in the vertical market computing arena. A few years ago,
the Big Three of industrial computing terminals and solutionsÑSymbol, Norand, and
TelxonÑreigned supreme and anchored every major trade show with their pavilions
displaying the latest in no-nonsense, practical solutions for real world field
force automation applications.
Today, of those three companies, only Symbol Technologies remains as
an independent entity. Norand was bought by Intermec, itself a business segment
of integrated systems solutions giant UNOVA. And Telxon, after a couple of
difficult years where the company tried to reinvent itself, was acquired by
Symbol Technologies on July 26, 2000. As stated above, none of these moves
attract much coverage beyond perhaps a small feature in the business section of
the Wall Street Journal. That's partially because industrial terminals and
integrated systems solutions aren't as sexy as iMacs, and partially because, even
after all those mergers and acquisitions, the remaining players are not very
large by Fortune 100 standards. UNOVA and the newly formed Symbol/Telxon combined
have projected 2000 sales of just under US$4 billion, about half of what Apple,
the underdog of personal computing, will have this year. Listening in on the
conference call announcement of the takeover was interesting. Symbol chairman
Jerome Swartz called it a "friendly stock merger," a "superb opportunity," and
mentioned how well Telxon's "complementary products and technologies" will fit
into Symbol's future. Telxon chairman CEO John W. Paxton stated that "giving up
our independent existence was obviously a difficult decision" and that Telxon had
been on the right track to be a financially viable independent company. The
actual financials, however, spoke volumes: Symbol announced a record quarter of
US$341 million in sales and US$36 million in profit. Telxon had flat revenue of
US$86 million and, despite a high order backlog and the recent purchase of
Kinetic's PC/Rover product line, a loss of over ten million.
What drives this sort of drastic consolidation? Primarily economies of
scale. It is enormously difficult for the makers of industrial computers to
remain in business. Rapid progress in computing technology renders their products
obsolete before they even reach customers. The sales cycle is long and costly,
often taking years from first contact to deployment of actual product. Also, you
don't buy systems solutions at CompUSA. Successfully providing them requires a
carefully built and nurtured network of VARs (Value Added Resellers), ISVs
(Independent Software Vendors), and OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) in
addition to the primary vendors' own internal business development facilities.
Almost every vendor of pen computing technology has run into this
problem. The result is consolidation at every level. If you peruse the Buyer's
Guide section of an older issue of Pen Computing Magazine, you will find a good
number of companies who have since either disappeared, merged with others, or
been swallowed by others. Digital Ocean is gone, Badger was bought out, as were
Teklogix and Ramline. Husky was acquired by Itronix and Fujitsu Personal Systems
merged into the Fujitsu PC Company. Kalidor, TelePad, M3I, and Cruise
Technologies are gone. IBM, Toshiba, Ricoh, TexasMicro pulled out, and it looks
like Mitsubishi will, too. Others have sort of faded from the scene, redirecting
their efforts into other fields. Examples are Dauphin, Vadem, Sharp, and
Motorola.
This is not to say that dedicated, well focused companies cannot flourish
in the vertical pen market, even if they are not very large. WalkAbout does very
well with its hardened Hammerhead pen slates. Xplore has just landed a big
contract thanks to its acquisition of Ramline. And there are several other
smaller manufacturers who do quite well.
To me, there is another component to this consolidation, and that's the
increasing proliferation and importance of inexpensive, standardized, and more or
less generic handheld technology. When I attended Symbol's second annual Software
Developers Conference in June (see report on page 38 of this issue) I expected a
lot of dry sessions on legacy technology. Instead, the entire conference centered
was totally future-oriented, centering around handhelds powered by Windows and
the Palm OS, enterprise integration, wireless, and the Web. Symbol has clearly
seen the light and is gearing up for a future where small, inexpensive handhelds
and palmtops will be deployed by the hundreds of thousands, and even millions.
This trend towards using industry standard handhelds in vertical markets
has actually been going on for a couple of years now. Virtually every player in
the vertical market systems solutions field has at least investigated the idea of
designing handhelds that are smaller, lighter, less complex, less vulnerable, and
less expensive than traditional, full-function Windows clamshell or pen tablet
computers. While not all of the early efforts were successful, I think that was
less because of the design and quality of the devices and more because of
Microsoft's painful struggles with Windows CE. Continuity and stability are of
utmost importance in markets where the lifespan of equipment is measured in terms
of several years instead of just 12 to 24 months. In addition, designing a new
relatively low volume product, and keeping it updated, is tough enough for big
companies. For the little guys it may be close to suicide to bet the farm on
Microsoft just to find that the winds of mobile technology up in Redmond have
changed yet again.
This, by the way, may well be the reason why the Palm OS is making
surprising inroads into the vertical and enterprise markets. The Palm platform is
a veritable rock of stability compared to almost everything else out there. Last
year's Wintel and WinRISC processors are old hat and usually don't stand a
chance of even making it past the first round of an RFP (Request for Proposal)
process, the almighty roadblock to getting corporate sales. Palms, on the other
hand, started out with a wheezy 16MHz processor that had been obsolete for years
even when the first Pilot was introduced. Four years later all Palms still use
that processor and the only change is that some use a variant that can run at
20MHz instead of 16. Palm software hasn't changed and no one has ever complained
that his or her Palm isn't fast enough, or that battery life is poor, or that the
thing costs too much. There's a lesson there, and one that the competition better
learns quickly.
At the Symbol Conference, for example, Palm came across as the leader and
aggressor while Microsoft seemed on the defensive, despite the fact that Symbol
has dozens of Windows-powered devices and only two that use the Palm OS (the SPT
1500 and 1700/1740).
As you peruse this issue of Pen Computing Magazine you'll see that the
Palm/Microsoft battle is in full force. We have collected what are probably the
most complete comparison tables of all current Pocket PC (page 56) and Palm OS
(page 80) devices. Each table contains not only all pertinent specifications, but
also performance benchmarks. On the Pocket PC side, BSQUARE's release of a Pocket
PC compatible version of its bUSEFUL Analyzer confirmed what we already knew from
hands-on use: the Compaq iPAQ is the fastest Pocket PC, and also the overall
fastest Windows CE device we've ever tested.
In this issue you also find detailed reviews of three newcomers to the
Pocket PC camp. Casio's "multimedia" EM-500 and the ruggedized EG-80/800 offer
excellent performance and functionality tailor-made for their respective
purposes.
In the Palm OS section you'll find a detailed look at the all-new Palm
m100, a device that Palm editor Shawn Barnett calls "a new device for new
markets." You'll also find a first glance at the Palm VIIx and a guide to all
available and announced Springboard modules for the Handspring Visor, 38 in all.
Conrad H. Blickenstorfer is editor-in-chief of Pen Computing Magazine and
general editor of Digital Camera Magazine. He can be reached via e-mail at chb@pencomputing.com.
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